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THE GREAT RECESSION AND THE
RHETORICAL CANONS OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS
Michael D. Murray*
ABSTRACT
The Great Recession of 2008 and onward has drawn attention
to the American economic and financial system and has cast a
critical spotlight on the theories, policies, and assumptions of
the modern, neoclassical school of law and economics-often
labeled the "Chicago School"-because this school of legal
economic thought has had great influence on the American
The Chicago School's
economy and financial system.
positions on deregulationand the limitation or elimination of
oversight and government restraints on stock markets,
derivative markets, and other financial practices are the
result of decades of neoclassical economic assumptions
regarding the efficiency of unregulated markets, the nearreligious-like devotion to a hyper-simplified conception of
rationality and self-interest with regard to the persons and
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and Terry Phelps (American), for their comments on the presentation of this Article.
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institutions participating in the financial system, and a
conception of laws and government policies as incentives and
costs in a manner that excludes the actual conditions and
complications of reality.
This Article joins the critical conversation on the Great
Recession and the role of law and economics in this crisis by
examining neoclassical and contemporary law and economics
from the perspective of legal rhetoric. The Great Recession
has already caused several of the stars of the Chicago School
to recant their most definite statements concerning market
efficiency and the necessity of non-regulation and zero
government oversight (or interference) in the financial system.
The law and economics movement is likely to regroup or
reform itself under a revised conception of market efficiency,
as indicated by the chastened admissions of the leaders of the
old school, or move in the direction of a revised conception of
rational choice theory represented by the thriving school of
behavioral law and economics.
To facilitate better
understanding of the law and economics movement now and
in the future, this Article joins the discussion by pointing out
the fundamental rhetorical canons of law and economics.
These canons have made law and economics a persuasive
form of discourse:
"

Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and
demonstration;

*

The characterizationof legal phenomena as incentives
and costs;

*

The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and

*

Rational choice theory as corrected by modern
behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain
science.

Law and economics has developed into a school of
contemporary legal rhetoric with a particular, effective
combination of topics of invention and arrangement and
tropes of style that are relevant to legal rhetoric beyond the
economic analysis of law. This Article is the first to examine
the prescriptive implications of the rhetoric of law and
economics for general legal discourse as opposed to examining
the benefits and limitations of the economic analysis of law
itself. This Article advances the conversation in two areas:
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first, as to the study and understandingof the persuasiveness
of law and economics, particularly because that
persuasiveness has played a role in influencing American
economic and financial policy leading up to the Great
Recession; and second, as to the study and understandingof
the use of economic topics of invention and arrangement and
tropes of style in general legal discourse when evaluated in
comparison to the other schools of classicaland contemporary
legal rhetoric. The author concludes that the rhetorical
canons of law and economics can be used to create meaning
and inspire imagination in legal discourse beyond the
economic analysis of law, but the canons are tools that are
only as good as the user, and can be corrupted in ways that
helped to bring about the current economic crisis.
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY HAVE LAW AND ECONOMICS'
RECOMMENDATIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE
ECONOMY AND THE BANKING AND FINANCIAL
SYSTEM BEEN SO PERSUASIVE LEADING UP TO THE
GREAT RECESSION1?
This Article examines law and economics as a school of
contemporary legal rhetoric with a particular combination of
rhetorical modes of communication and persuasion-the
rhetorical canons of law and economics-that has made its
recommendations and prescriptions for the economy and the
banking and financial system persuasive to many audiences
within and without the legal community. The Article's goal is to
critique the rhetoric of the neoclassical and contemporary law
and economics 2 analysis of law, not to examine the benefits or

1. The term "Great Recession" is borrowed from Nobel Laureate Professor
Joseph Stiglitz, who recently discounted decades of neoclassical economic
assumptions when he pointed out that "markets do not work well on their own[,]"
and that, in the recent recession, the United States suffered because the economy
lost its "balance between the role of markets and the role of government." JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD
ECONOMY xii (2010).

2. The term "contemporary law and economics" refers to twenty-first century
law and economics that incorporates behavioral and socio-economic approaches to the
study and analysis of law. Contemporary law and economics has evolved from "new"
or "neoclassical" law and economics that developed in the 1960s, which applied
neoclassical economic principles and methodologies to the analysis of law. New or
neoclassical law and economics is also referred to as "traditional" or "conventional"
law and economics. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
31 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW]; Thomas F.
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costs of the application of one form of economic analysis or
another in shaping law and social policy. 3 This Article seeks to
examine law and economics as a rhetorical perspective in law so
as to reveal and demonstrate the combination of rhetorical canons
that helped bring about the Great Recession. 4

Cotter, Legal Pragmatismand the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071,
2088 (1996); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical
Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 77, 83, 138 (2004)
[hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character]; Donald C. Langevoort,
Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 71, 73; Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law and Economics,
Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. &
LIBR. 470, 470-72 (2007).
3. Neither does this Article examine the Pareto superiority or Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency obtained through contemporary economic analysis of law. See ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 18 (5th ed. 2008) (introducing the
Pareto superiority and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency concepts in economics).
4. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Reform" and the New
CorporateSocial Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 619 (2001) (one canon of law
and economics rhetoric is the marked preference for scientific and mathematical
methods of analysis, which sometimes were applied to human conditions that are not
properly reduced to simple equations: "In its more extreme forms, law and economics
solutions to problems of human behavior were paraded as 'science' (not as social
science but as 'science'), the findings of which were unassailable. Those who
questioned were made to appear ignorant or foolish."); see also Timothy A. Canova,
The FailingBubble Economy: American Exceptionalism and the Crisis in Legitimacy,
102 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 237, 238 (2008) (the canons were used to suppress
criticism of economic policy: "Lawyers and legal scholars have tended not to question
the economic assumptions of orthodox economic models"); Timothy A. Canova, Legacy
of the Clinton Bubble, DISSENT, Summer 2008, at 41, available at
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=1229 (charting the economic policies
that played a role in bringing about the Great Recession); Chunlin Leonhard,
Subprime Mortgages and the Case for Broadening the Duty of Good Faith, 45 U.S.F.
L. REV. 621, 622 (2011) (same); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Morals of the Marketplace:
A CautionaryEssay for Our Time, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 171, 173 (2009) (same);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Board as a Path to Corporate Social Responsibility, in
THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE LAW (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007) (same). Even the unofficial dean of the

Chicago School, Judge Richard Posner, has admitted the connection between
neoclassical law and economics and the present economic crisis. See RICHARD
POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO

DEPRESSION xii, 270 (2009):
We are learning from [the crisis] that we need a more active and intelligent
government to keep our model of a capitalist economy from running off the
rails ....
[T]he market can be blamed for recessions, which without
government intervention would often turn into depressions, as they often
did before the government learned (we thought!) in the after-math of the
Great Depression how to prevent that from happening.
Alan Greenspan, previously a staunch advocate of non-regulation of the financial
markets, has recently recanted his faith in the self-correcting power of free markets.
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Rhetoric does not often share the same paragraph in
academic legal writing with law and economics, let alone the
same article title. 5 Notably, however, a central focus of the
discipline of law and economics is the study of human nature and
human behavior 6 in order to predict what incentives can be
communicated to humans that will motivate them to act or react;
for this reason, law and economics shares a common goal with
The
rhetoric-the study of communication and persuasion.
their
advocates of the economic analysis of law must persuade
own cohorts of the truth of their discoveries, and use the rhetoric
of their discipline to do so. They must also seek to communicate
the lessons of their economic analysis of law to the wider legal
community, and again use the rhetoric of their discipline to
persuade the wider audience. The fact that law and economics is
persuasive beyond the confirmed members of the discipline is
supported by modern history: critics and supporters alike agree
that law and economics has established itself as the dominant
and most influential contemporary mode of analysis among
American legal scholars. 7

EDMUND L. ANDREWS, BUSTED: LIFE INSIDE THE GREAT MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 65
(2009) (quoting Alan Greenspan). See also Alan Greenspan, The Crisis,BROOKINGS,

202 (Spring 2010),
http://www.brookings. edu/-/media/Projects/BPEA/Spring%202010/2010a-bpea-green
span.PDF). Critics have noted that the Chicago School has worked its effects not
only on the United States economy, but globally. See Paul H. Brietzke, Law and
Economics Meets the GreatRecession (2012) (on file with the author).
5. One exception is Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics,
86 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1988) [hereinafter McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and
Economics], a very useful discussion to which this Article refers infra.
6. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (1998) ("[L]aw and
economics analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about actual
human behavior"); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) [hereinafter Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science]
("Law and economics is, at root, a behavioral theory, and therein lies its true
power.").
7. Law and economics' critics and proponents alike agree that the law and
economics movement has become the most dominant method of legal analysis among
legal scholars in at least the last fifty years. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon,
The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character,CriticalRealism, Power
Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 143 (2003) [hereinafter
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation] (quoting Joyce S. Sterling, The State of American
Sociology of Law, in DEVELOPING SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: A WORLD-WIDE
DOCUMENTARY ENQUIRY 805, 809 (Vincenzo Ferrari ed., 1990), and Marc Galanter &

Mark Alan Edwards, Law and Society & Law and Economics: Common Ground,
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The recognition that the rhetoric of law and economics is
persuasive-and not only to legal economists-reveals the
enormous potential of law and economics as a lens through which
to examine the structure and design of legal discourse, and as a
source of topoi (topics) of invention and arrangement and tropes of
style in the content of the discourse. It also helps to explain why
so many persons in the academy, the legal profession, the courts,
and the government could be persuaded to alter the economy and
financial system of the United States in accordance with the
prescriptions of law and economics in ways that helped to bring
about the Great Recession.
The topoi and tropes of law and economics inspire inventive
thinking about the law that constructs meaning for the author
and the audience.
For many members of the legal writing
discourse
community-judges,
practitioners,
government
agencies, and academics-the modes of persuasion of law and
economics can provide a critical perspective to construct meaning
and improve the persuasiveness of legal discourse generally in
content, arrangement, and style. As such, law and economics
rhetoric should be recognized as a new school of contemporary
rhetoric8 that joins the existing schools-modern argument
theory,9 writing as a process theory,1 ° and discourse community
IrreconcilableDifferences, New Directions: Introduction: The Path of the Law Ands,
1997 WIs. L. REV. 375, 378 (1997)) which states:
The law and economics movement is quite strongly entrenched in the
law schools, and is more powerful there than any of the other social
sciences
....
[Tihe flourishing of law and economics [is]
undeniable ....
Economic analysis of law.., has transformed
American legal thought, . .. [and] enjoyed unparalleled success in the
legal academy and in the judiciary. .. [making it] the most important
development in legal scholarship of the twentieth century.
See also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at xix ("[Law and

economics is] the foremost interdisciplinary field of legal studies"); Kenji Yoshino,
The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 n.6 (2005) (arguing that law and

economics surpasses other movements in legal analysis, including law and
literature).
8. For basic sources on contemporary rhetoric, see generally PATRICIA BIZZEL &
BRUCE HERZBERG, THE RHETORICAL TRADITION (Patricia Bizzel & Bruce Herzberg
eds., 1990); PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE (1987); Carroll C. Arnold, Rhetoric
in America since 1900, in RE-ESTABLISHING THE SPEECH PROFESSION: THE FIRST
FIFTY YEARS (Robert T. Oliver & Marvin G. Bauer eds., 1959); John B. Bender &

David E. Wellbery, Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of Rhetoric, in THE ENDS
OF RHETORIC: HISTORY, THEORY, PRACTICE (John B. Bender & David E. Wellbery
eds., 1990); James L. Kinneavy, Contemporary Rhetoric, in THE PRESENT STATE OF
SCHOLARSHIP IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC (Winifred Bryan
Horner ed., rev. ed. 1990). See also sources cited infra at notes 9-11.
9. See, e.g., JEROME BRUNER & ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, MINDING THE LAW,
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theory"-as a lens through which to examine and improve the
persuasiveness of legal discourse.
Law and economics is a discipline that brings a unique
12
combination of modes of persuasion used both as rhetorical topoi
chs. 2-3, 6-7 (2002); CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW
RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver
trans., 1969); STEPHEN TOULMIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO REASONING (2d ed.
1984) [hereinafter TOULMIN, INTRODUCTION TO REASONING]; FRANS H. VAN
EEMEREN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF
HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996); Linda L.
Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in
Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949
(2007) (discussing the corporate metaphor in modern argument theory); Linda L.
Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of
Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS
169 (2004) (discussing the use of metaphors in modern argument theory and
cognitive studies); Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An
Annotated Bibliography, 3 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 129, 139 (2006)
[hereinafter Smith, Rhetoric Theory]; Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion:An Annotated
Bibliography,6 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 75, 80-81 (2009).
10. See Linda L. Berger, A Reflective RhetoricalModel: The Legal Writing Teacher
as Reader and Writer, 6 LEGAL WRITING 57 (2000); Linda L. Berger, Applying New
Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and
Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1999); Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against
the Tyranny of Paraphrase:Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163 (1993);
Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, "To Say What the Law Is" Learning the Practice of Legal
Rhetoric, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 861, 866 (1995); Carol McCrehan Parker, Writing
Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need It and How to Achieve It, 76
NEB. L. REV. 561 (1997); Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 Sw. L.J.
1089 (1986); Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 9, at 139.
11. See Brook K. Baker, LanguageAcculturation Processand the Resistance to In
"doctrine" ation in the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary on
Mertz's CriticalAnthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 131 (2000); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and Entering
the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002); Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower
of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV.
887, 890 (2002); J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing. A Revised
View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35 (1994); Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 9, at 139;
Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile:How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to
the Law's Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7, 9 (1998); Joseph
M. Williams, On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and
Development, 1 LEGAL WRITING 1 (1991).
12. In rhetoric, the topoi [Greek] or loci [Latin] (singular, topos or locus = place)
are the "topics" or "subjects" of argument that can be made in various situations.
Topoi are developed in the process of inventio [Latin] or heuresis [Greek], which may
be translated as "invention" or "discovery" of the type of argument that will be most
persuasive in the situation, and in the dispositio [Latin] or taxis [Greek] of the
argument, which translates as the "arrangement" or "organization" or "disposition" of
the contents of the argument. See EDWARD P.J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS,
CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 17, 20, 89-91 (4th ed. 1999);
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and tropes1 3 to construct meaning and to inform and persuade its
audiences. The examination of contemporary law and economics
as a rhetorical perspective requires discussion of the following
theses:
"

Law and economics is inherently rhetorical and uses
its own rhetoric to persuade the members of the law
and economics discourse community as well as the
legal community as a whole.

*

Law and economics uses a unique combination of
modes of persuasion as rhetorical topoi and tropesthe rhetorical canons of law and economics-which
are:
o Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis
and demonstration;
o The characterization of legal phenomena as
incentives and costs;
o The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and
o Rational choice theory as corrected by the modern
behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and
brain science.

The rhetorical canons of law and economics alone did not
cause the Great Recession. Canons of rhetoric are tools for legal

Gabriele Knappe, Classical Rhetoric in Anglo-Saxon England, 27 ANGLO-SAXON
ENGLAND 5, 25 (1998).
13. Tropes are developed in the rhetorical process of style (Latin elocutio; Greek
lexis), which pertains to the composition and wording of the discourse, including
grammar, word choice, and figures of speech. See generally CORBETT & CONNORS,
supra note 12, at 20, 378; Knappe, supra note 12, at 25-26; Smith, Rhetoric Theory,
supra note 9, at 133-34 n.2 (collecting sources on style in classical rhetoric). Figures
of speech were divided into tropes (creative variations on the meanings of words) and
schemes (artful deviations from the ordinary arrangements of words). Linda L.
Berger, Studying and Teaching "Law as Rhetoric": A Place to Stand, 16 J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. 3, 51 n.179 (2010) [hereinafter Berger, Law as Rhetoric]. Professors
Berger, Corbett, and Connors identify the classically identified tropes as metaphor,
simile, synecdoche, and metonymy; puns; antanaclasis (or repetition of a word in two
different senses); paronomasia (use of words that sound alike but have different
meanings); periphrasis (substitution of a descriptive word for a proper name or of a
proper name for a quality associated with the name); personification; hyperbole;
litotes (deliberate use of understatement); rhetorical question; irony; onomatopoeia;
oxymoron; and paradox. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra, note 12, at 395-409; Berger,
Law as Rhetoric, supra, at 51 n.179. See also MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL
WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 199-248 (metaphors),
328-40 (other tropes) (2d ed. 2008).
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discourse, not universal goals or perfect solutions. The Law
should be communicated to people in a manner that maximizes
the audience's incentives to accept and to be persuaded by the
legal communication, and that minimizes the costs that the
communication imposes on the audience. Law and economics
provides a rhetorical lens through which a legal author might
examine and improve the persuasiveness of his or her discourse
regarding the economy, governmental regulation, or any other
topic of the law. But a lens, like any other tool, is only as good as
its user. This Article concludes that the rhetorical canons of law
and economics can be used to create meaning and inspire
imagination in legal discourse beyond the economic analysis of
law, but the choice to employ the canons must be made with
regard to the rhetorical concept of ethos and the needs, demands,
and limitations of the rhetorical situation at hand. 14
II. THE RHETORICAL NATURE OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS
A. LAW AND ECONOMICS IS INHERENTLY RHETORICAL
Law and economics, like all disciplines of academic inquiry
and study, uses rhetoric to explain and justify its assumptions,
models, paradigms, assertions, and predictions. 15 To understand
why law and economics is inherently rhetorical, one must
understand the nature of rhetoric: Rhetoric is the "discovery and
Rhetoric is the
transmission of insight and knowledge."16
14. A situation is rhetorical when the audience of the message in the situation
has the opportunity to alter reality. When the audience has no choice, the situation
A situation is made up of: subject-place-time-audienceis not rhetorical.
speaker. See Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 6-8, 38992 (1968); Greenhaw, sapranote 10, at 875-80.
15. See McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 5, at 760. As one
scholar states:
[W]e are now invited to think hard about the rhetoric of everything;
"the rhetoric of philosophy," "the rhetoric of sociology," "the rhetoric of
religion," even "the rhetoric of science." Though these rhetorics are not
all of the same kind, we should realize that all of these fields depend
on rhetoric in their arguments. Most of them are in fact grappling
with rhetorical issues, as they debate their professional claims.
WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF RHETORIC: THE QUEST FOR EFFECTIVE
COMMUNICATION xii (2004) [hereinafter BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF RHETORIC]
(emphasis in original).

16. Francis J. Mootz, III, Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal
Argumentation, and The Natural Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 317
(1999) (quoting Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Expressive Power of Language, 107
PUBLICATIONS MOD. LANGUAGE ASS'N AM. 348 (1992)). See also James Boyd White,
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discipline that examines "ways of winning others over to our
views, and of justifying those views to ourselves as well as others,
when the question of how things in the world ought to work is
contested or contestable."' 7 "Rhetoric is primarily a verbal,
situationally contingent, epistemic art that is both philosophical
and practical and gives rise to potentially active texts.'
Much of
the scholarly attention within the discipline of rhetoric has been
directed to effective communication with a particular focus on
techniques for persuasive communication and argumentation;
thus, many familiar definitions of rhetoric revolve around
persuasion in discourse. 19
This Article refers to the academic study of rhetoric, both in
its classical" and contemporary 2 forms. Rhetoric as the study of
Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 684, 695 (1985) [hereinafter White, Law as Rhetoric]:
Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like law, it invents out of
something rather than out of nothing. It always starts in a
particular culture and among particular people. There is always
one speaker addressing others in a particular situation, about
concerns that are real and important to somebody, and speaking a
particular language.
Rhetoric always takes place with given
materials.
17. BRUNER & AMSTERDAM, supra note 9. See also White, Law as Rhetoric, supra

note 16, at 684 (stating that rhetoric establishes, maintains, and transforms the
community and the culture); James Boyd White, A Symposium: The Theology of the
Practice of Law February 14, 2002 Roundtable Discussion, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1087,
1090 (2002) ("[Tlhe minute we begin to think and talk about anything at all we live
in the world of language, a world of contingent resources for thought and speech, and
rhetoric is a perfectly good term for how we do that.").
18. William A. Covino & David A. Jolliffe, What is Rhetoric?, in RHETORIC:
CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS, BOUNDARIES 5 (1995).
19. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF Civic DISCOURSE 1355b
(George A. Kennedy trans., 1991); ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, bk. 1, ch. 2 (W. Rhys

Roberts
trans.,
Lee
Honeycutt
ed.,
1965),
available
at
http://www.public.iastate.edu/-honeyl/Rhetoric/
[hereinafter
ARISTOTLE,
THE
RHETORIC] ("Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case
the available means of persuasion."); JOHN J. MAKAY, SPEAKING WITH AN AUDIENCE:
COMMUNICATING IDEAS AND ATTITUDES 9 (3d ed. 1984) ("Rhetoric is defined 'as the

process of human communication in which a speaker sorts, selects, and sends
symbols for the specific purpose of evoking a precise response' from an audience.");
KRISTEN K. ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS AND PERSUASION 9 (2009) [hereinafter ROBBINS-TISCIONE,
RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS] ("[R]hetoric here refers to the art of persuasion

through eloquent, inventive, and strategically organized discourse, both oral and
written."); Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1545, 1546 (1990) ("By 'rhetoric,' I mean the discipline.., in which the objects
of formal study are the conventions of discourse and argument.").
20. Classical rhetoric began in the fifth century B.C.E. and was continued over
the course of the next 1,000 years of Greco-Roman history by Aristotle, Cicero, and
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Quintilian; this constitutes the defining study of public discourse in classical times.
See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 12, at 15-16, 18-19. The scholarship and
teachings of classical rhetoric were followed as the dominant discipline for developing
legal arguments until the first quarter of the nineteenth century. See id. at 2, 15.
The origin of classical rhetoric as a discipline devoted to the study of legal discourse
See, e.g., Michael Frost,
and argumentation is traced to Corax of Syracuse.
Introduction to Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
613, 615 (1999) [hereinafter Frost, Lost Heritage]. Socrates and his student, Plato,
critiqued the early tenets of the discipline, see text accompanying note 22 infra, and
Plato's student, Aristotle, subsequently refined those tenets. See JOHN H. MACKIN,
CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR MODERN DISCOURSE vii, 6-7, 17-18, 26 (1969). The most
important writings of classical rhetoric are those of Aristotle, ARISTOTLE, THE
RHETORIC, supra note 19; Cicero, MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE INVENTIONE 93, 104

(H.M. Hubbell trans., 1949); MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE ORATORE (E.W. Sutton
trans., 1942); and QUINTILIAN, 1 MARIUS FABIUS QUINTILLAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA

273 (H.E. Butler trans., 1954), which together define the canons of the discipline that
serve as a rhetorical lens on legal discourse.
21. The contemporary period of rhetoric began in the twentieth century. Major
movements in thought have broadened the study of rhetoric to include all aspects of
communication. ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS, supra note 19,

at 61. This includes linguistics, ethics and persuasion, practical reasoning, human
motivation, composition theories, cognitive studies, and socio-epistemic studies. Id.
at 61-82. See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY (Annette Layers &
Colin Smith trans., 1968) (language as symbols); KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF
MOTIVES (1969) [hereinafter BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES] (impact of culture);
KENNETH BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES (1950) [hereinafter BURKE, A RHETORIC
OF MOTIVES] (impact of culture); UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS (1976)
(language as symbols); MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE
EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1996) (modern media studies); C. K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS,
THE MEANING OF MEANING (1972) (language and meaning); I.A. RICHARDS, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC (1936) (language and meaning); RICHARD M. WEAVER,
THE ETHICS OF RHETORIC (1953) (ethics); Bitzer, supra note 14, at 6-8, 389-92 (the
impact of situation). Over time, the cognitive rhetoric group divided into two
separate groups: the process theory cognitivists and the discourse community
cognitivists. The process theory cognitivists believe that the study of rhetoric should
focus on the process of writing, a recursive creative process rather than a linear one.
The process of writing teaches writers how to reason, persuade, and improve their
communication by examining each stage of the writing process. See ROBBINSTISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS, supra note 19, at 79. On the other hand,
the discourse community cognitivists believe the study of rhetoric is a study of the
writer's assimilation into and acceptance of the tenets, vocabulary, and expectations
of a discourse community, such as the legal writing discourse community. See id. A
third school of thought, the socio-epistemic group, combines social theories of
community with epistemological theories of learning to form a theory of
communication that considers the interaction of speaker, subject matter, and
audience. See id. at 81. The common thread among these schools of thought in the
developing discipline of contemporary rhetoric was a shift in thinking regarding the
nature of knowledge and truth. Kristen K. Robbins, Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal
Education: Understandingthe Schism Between Doctrinal and Legal Writing Faculty,
3 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 108, 123 (2006). Beginning in the 1950s,
Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman asserted that truth is relative. Id.; see, e.g.,
STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, USES OF ARGUMENT (2003); CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF
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persuasion and argument has a noble and classical tradition, but
the discipline has had difficulty shaking off a common but
enduring slur that is traced to ancient sources: Socrates and
Plato described the early study and practice of rhetoric by the
ancient Greek Sophists as the art of flattery and trickery, and the
slur has stuck throughout the ages. 22 However, this slur is not
the subject of this Article. Rhetoric, the academic discipline, is
not the study of hollow speech, nor is it puffery designed to prop
up specious assertions, nor hyperbole employed to distract an
audience from the truths or falsities of the speakers' position.2 3
In short, it is nothing like the meaning of the commonplace
phrase, "mere rhetoric. ' 24 This Article does not examine law and
economics as a scheme of flattery and trickery but rather as a
discipline with a well-developed system of argumentation and
persuasion that offers lessons for legal discourse beyond the
RHETORIC (William Kluback trans., 1982) [hereinafter PERELMAN, REALM OF
RHETORIC]; PERELMAN & OBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 9. Toulmin argued that
people in everyday life do not use Aristotelian logic to establish conclusive proof,' but
rather use "informal logic" to reason and to acquire knowledge.
TOULMIN,
INTRODUCTION TO REASONING, supra note 9, at 94-134. The knowledge acquired and
the arguments made are only probable, not absolute. Id. Like Toulmin, Perelman
argued that appeals to reason lead only to probable truths: "the appeal to reason
must be identified not as an appeal to a single truth but instead as an appeal for the
adherence of an audience .... CHAIM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC: A THEORY
OF PRACTICAL REASONING, GREAT IDEAS TODAY 234-52 (1970), reprinted in JAMES L.
GOLDEN ET AL., THE RHETORIC OF WESTERN THOUGHT 234-52 (6th ed. 1997). From
these beginnings, three contemporary theories of rhetoric arose to focus on the
construction of meaning, the creation of arguments, and the processes that allow the
creation of meaning and argumentation. See Linda Levine & Kurt M. Saunders,
Thinking Like a Rhetor, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 108, 118-21 (1993). These contemporary
theories are: Modern Argument Theory, Writing as a Process Theory, and the Theory
of Discourse Communities. See Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 9, at 139.
22. Socrates apparently did not devote his time to the publication of works, so we
rely on Plato whose writings purport to represent Socrates' criticisms of rhetoric in
such
famous
dialogues
as
PLATO,
PHAEDRUS,
available
at
http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/ dialogues/7_phaedrus.htm, PLATO, GORGIAS,
available at http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/dialogues/15_gorgias.htm,
and
PLATO,
PHAEDO,
available
at
http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/
dialogues/14_phaedo.htm.
23. See, e.g., KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL, THE RHETORICAL ACT 3-4 (1982); Wayne
C. Booth, The Rhetorical Stance, in Toward a New Rhetoric, 14 C. COMPOSITION &
COMM. 139, 139 (1963) [hereinafter Booth, The Rhetorical Stance]; Wayne C. Booth,
1987 Ryerson Lecture: The Idea of a University as Seen by a Rhetorician (1987),
available at http://home.uchicago.edu/-ahkissel/boothbooth.htm).
24. See BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF RHETORIC, supra note 15, at vii, x, 6-7; Booth,
The Rhetorical Stance, supra note 23, at 139; Eileen A. Scallen, Evidence Law as
PragmaticLegal Rhetoric: Reconnecting Legal Scholarship, Teaching and Ethics, 21
QUINNIPIAC. L. REV. 813, 817, 829 (2003).
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realm of economic analysis of law.
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RHETORIC OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS

The discipline of economics is rhetorical,2 5 as is the discipline
of law and economics.2 ' Adam Smith, the honorary father of
economics, apparently understood the rhetorical imperatives of
economics and the law when, in his Lectures on Jurisprudenceconcerning principle in the human mind and the division of
labor-he commented on the topic of exchanges and self-interest:
The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have
so plain and simple a meaning, is in reality offering
an argument to persuade one to do so and so for it is
in his interest ....
Men always endevour [sic] to
persuade others to be of their opinion even when the
matter is of no consequence to them ....
And in this
manner every one is practicing oratory on others thro

[sic] the whole of his life.27
Robert L. Heilbroner interprets Smith to mean that "the
basis for economic relationships lies not in a disinterested
calculation of advantages, but in the 'faculties of reason and
speech' that underlie the capacity for persuasion."28
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who is quoted in Cooter and Ulen's
seminal text on law and economics, 29 explained that:
For the rational study of the law the black-letter man
may be the man of the present, but the man of the

25. See DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS xix-xx, 5 (2d ed.
1998) [MCCLOSKEY, RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS]; see generally Arjo Klamer & Donald
N. McCloskey, Economics in the Human Conversation, in ARJO KLAMER, DONALD N.
MCCLOSKEY & ROBERT M. SOLOw, THE CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC RHETORIC 3-4,
11 (1988); DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE AND
PERSUASION IN ECONOMICS 38-52 (1994). Note that the author, Donald N.
McCloskey, became Deirdre N. McCloskey; the two names refer to the same author,
but in my citations I will use the name or names used at the time of publication of
the works cited herein.
26. McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 5, at 760.
27. Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, in ARJO KLAMER, DONALD N.
MCCLOSKEY & ROBERT M. SOLow, THE CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC RHETORIC 38
(1988) [hereinafter Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy] (quoting Adam Smith,
Lectures on Jurisprudence,(1762)).
28. Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra note 27, at 38.
29. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3.
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We learn that for everything we have

to give up something else, and we are taught to set
the advantage we gain against the other advantage
we lose, and to know what we are doing when we
elect.3 °
Judge Richard Posner summarizes the foundational rhetoric
of law and economics as follows:
[T]he most interesting aspect of the law and
economics movement has been its aspiration to place
the study of law on a scientific basis, with coherent
theory, precise hypotheses deduced from the theory,
and empirical tests of the hypotheses. Law is...
amenable to scientific study. Economics is the most
advanced of the social sciences, and the legal system
contains many parallels to and overlaps with the
31
systems that economists have studied successfully.
[The economic] approach enables the law to be seen,
grasped, and studied as a system-a system that
economic analysis can illuminate, reveal as coherent,
and in places improve.
By the same token, the
approach enables economics to be seen as a tool for
understanding and reforming social practices, rather
than merely as a formal system of daunting
32
mathematical complexity.
These excerpts confirm the rhetorical nature of law and
economics and point to the nature of the persuasion inherent in
this rhetoric.
C. THE NATURE OF THE RHETORIC OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Law and economics' persuasion is built from the application
of scientific analyses, especially mathematics
and the
quantitative analysis of empirical data, to cure social problems.33
30. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 1 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path
of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469, 474 (1897)).
31. Id. at 1 (quoting Richard A. Posner, Foreword to MICHAEL FAURE & ROGER
VAN DEN BERGH, ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 5, 5 (1989)) [hereinafter Posner,

Foreword].
32. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at xxi.

33. Heilbroner states:
Economics prides itself on its sciencelike character, and economists on
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The discipline of law attempts to deal with such problems; the
legal issues and social conditions that are imposed and
perpetuated by the state of the law may be subjected to economic
analyses "with coherent theory, precise hypotheses deduced from
the theory, and empirical tests of the hypotheses."3 4
Economics provides scientific theories to predict the effects of
legal rules on behavior. These behavioral theories surpass mere
intuition, logic, and common sense concerning human behavior;
they seek to predict how people will respond to laws when laws
Legal economists assert
are viewed as systems of incentives.
that economics is a persuasive rhetorical lens with which to view
the law because it has mathematically precise theories, such as
price theory and game theory. Economists also declare that
economics has empirically sound methods of analyzing the effects
of legal rules and sanctions, such as statistics and econometrics,
when legal rules and sanctions are viewed as incentives, prices,
or costs influencing presumptively rational human behavior.
desirable and efficient results for
Economics thereby achieves
36
society.
for
and
individuals
III. THE RHETORICAL CANONS OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS
A. THE FOUR CANONS
If law and economics is inherently rhetorical, What is the
rhetorical nature of this discipline when it analyzes and forms
recommendations and prescriptions concerning laws and
regulations affecting the economy and the banking and financial
system? To examine this question, it is helpful to recall that
economics combines mathematically precise theories and
their ability to speak like scientists, without color, passion, or values,
preferably in the language of mathematics .... [Miost [economics]
articles are "written" in matrix algebra, complex econometrics, formal
They would be
lemmas, and four-quadrant diagrammatics.
incomprehensible to anyone not trained in the vocabulary and
[T]he language of formalism
techniques of advanced economics ....
and mathematics is still a language, and therefore inescapably
"rhetorical."
Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra note 27, at 38-39.

See also Herbert M.

Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting Norms in the
Courtroom, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41-43, 59 (2009).
34. Posner, Foreword, supra note 31, at 5.
35. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 3-4.
36. See id. at 3-5. See also JEFFREYL. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 (4th ed.
2007); Kritzer, supra note 33, at 42-43, 59.
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empirically sound methods of analyzing the effects of incentives
and costs on presumptively rational human behavior for the
purpose of achieving efficient results for individuals and for
Thus, the four canons of law and economics rhetoric
society."
are:

38

(1) Mathematics and Science, which are used as the primary
39
method of analysis and demonstration;
a language used to characterize
(2) Incentives and Costs as
4°
law and the legal system;
(3) Efficiency, a rhetorical economic concept;41 and
(4) The Contemporary Theory of Rational Choice, as
corrected by modern behavioral social sciences, cognitive
42
studies, and brain science.
Each of these four canons of law and economics are used both
as topics of invention and arrangement, and as tropes of style in
persuasive discourse. The canons represent the fundamental
assumptions from which propositions regarding law and
economics will be measured as persuasive in both conception and
design, and according to which theses concerning law and
economics will be accepted as reliable and authoritative by the

37. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 3-5. The rhetorician James Boyd White
channeled the rhetoric of law and economics when he characterized the legal system
in the following way: "The overriding metaphor is that of the machine; the overriding
value is that of efficiency, conceived of as the attainment of certain ends with the
smallest possible costs." Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra note 21,
at 113-14 (quoting James Boyd White, Rhetoric and Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life, in THE RHETORIC OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES: LANGUAGE AND
ARGUMENT IN SCHOLARSHIP AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 298, 300 (John S. Nelson et al.

eds., 1987)).
38. The sources I have consulted to derive these four canons are many and varied,
but for general reference, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 2-5, 41-43; POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw, supra note 2, at 3-4, 9, 13, 21, 24-25, 495-96; Grant M.

Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics after Behavioral Economics, 55 U.
KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007).
39. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
40. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
41. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
42. See discussion infra Part III.B.4. Rational choice theory in simple terms is
the economic theory that humans will act rationally when confronted with choices,
and to act rationally means that the humans will act in furtherance of their selfinterest. Part III.B.4 discusses the recent developments of this theory in behavioral
social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science.
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43
members of the law and economics discourse community.
Because the canons determine whether propositions and theses
are persuasive and reliable, they can be aptly described as the
rhetoricalcanons of law and economics.

B. THE INTERACTION OF THE FOUR RHETORICAL CANONS
Canons of rhetoric are customarily depicted as interacting
together in a persuasive exercise, simultaneously affecting the
persuasiveness of the discourse within a discipline. Each canon
affects the operation of the other canons, making them more or
less persuasive.
In classical rhetoric, the three canons of
invention (aspects of persuasion that must be devised or
"invented" by the author or speaker), known as logos, ethos, and
pathos,44 are often depicted as a rhetorical triangle to suggest the
interaction of the factors and the combined impact on the
recipient of the discourse. For example:

43. "Discourse community' is a term that grounds this discussion in the rhetoric
of law and economics. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, UnderstandingChanged Readings:
Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 419-38 (1995) (discussing the economics
representing a change in discourse); Gary Minda, The JurisprudentialMovements of
the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 611 n.53 (1989) (describing the discourse of law and
economics).
44. See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 12, at 71-84; GEORGE A. KENNEDY,
CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO
MODERN TIMES 68, 75, 82, 89 (1999) [hereinafter KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC];

Covino & Joliffe, supra note 18, at 20, 52; Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 20, at 61718; Michael Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis: The Topics of Invention, 66 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 107, 127 (1992); Robin Smith, Aristotle's Logic, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2004), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ sum2002/entries/aristotle-logic/.
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With regard to the classical modes of invention, Jakob Wisse

45
presents the concept as a linear flow-chart:

James Kinneavy identifies these terms as Encoder - Signal -

Decoder, linking each canon of invention to reality, including the
author, the language or message, and the reader or audience.46
The author projects his ethos along with, or optimally as part of,
the logos of the message so as to influence the pathos of the

audience.
The rhetorical pathways are fundamentally pragmatic.4"
Aristotle sought to remind advocates that an argument is not onedimensional. The most logically constructed argument will not
persuade an audience if the audience questions the knowledge,
skill, or credibility of the author. Similarly, the most respected
author whose reputation is beyond question will not win the day
if her argument is riddled with logical fallacies and comes apart
at the seams with a single tug at one of its logical flaws. An
ironclad argument may be delivered in such a way as to
antagonize the audience, or the effect of the argument may be
squandered if the audience begins to question the integrity and
credibility of the author.4 9
Similarly, when employed properly, the four rhetorical
canons of law and economics interact simultaneously to persuade
an audience. Proper economic discourse incorporates each canon
for the persuasion of the audience. There is a connection and

45. JAKOB WISSE, ETHOS AND PATHOS FROM ARISTOTLE TO CICERO 8 (1989).

46. See JAMES L. KINNEAVY, A THEORY OF DISCOURSE: THE AIMS OF DISCOURSE
19 (1971); Linda L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing Teacher
as Reader and Writer, 6 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 57, 67 (2000); Phelps, supra note 10,
at 1091.
47. WISSE, supra note 45, at 7-8.
48. See Frost, Lost Heritage,supra note 20, at 614, 624-25, 627; Eileen A. Scallen,
ClassicalRhetoric, PracticalReasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
1717, 1728-29 (1995).
49. See generally CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 12, at 72-73; Michael Frost,
Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 DICK. L. REV. 85 (1994).
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interaction in the discourse of each canon to the others that
influences the persuasion of the audience-one cannot alter or
abandon the canons of efficiency, mathematical and scientific
certainty, response to incentives, and even rational choice
without affecting the persuasiveness and effectiveness of the
economic discourse.
An incorrect, overstated, or deceptive
message regarding one canon puts the others at risk of suspicion
or rejection by the audience. As with classical rhetorical modes of
invention, the interaction of the canons of law and economics may
be depicted visually, although with four canons it shall be a
rhetorical diamond, not a triangle:
DISCOURSE DIAMOND OF THE RHETORICAL CANONS OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS

Invention,
Arrangement, &
Style

Speaker

Message

Situation

Invention,
Arrangement, &
Style

Invention,
Arrangement, &
Style

Audience

Invention,
Arrangement, &
Style

In modern argument theory, the author of the discourse
(Speaker) codes the discourse (Message) for a particular receiver
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(Audience) according to the conditions, requirements, and
limitations of the context of the discourse (Situation). In law and
economics rhetorical discourse, the Speaker's purpose is most
closely aligned with the canon of Efficiency. The Message is
meant to achieve an efficient purpose; it is coded in the language
of Incentives and Costs and framed for the needs of the Audience
according to the Rational Choice Theory. The means used are
chosen in reference to the rhetorical Situation with a distinct
preference for the methods of Mathematics and Science.
Therefore, the interactive pattern of the rhetorical canons of law
and economics is designed to depict the flow of the discourse
wherein each of the four canons feeds into and simultaneously
draws from the others in alignment with modern argument
theory. This Article will next discuss each of the four canons in
turn.
1.

MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE: PRIMARY METHODS OF
ANALYSIS AND DEMONSTRATION

Practitioners of law and economics who follow the
conventional and contemporary approaches rely on the inherent
persuasiveness of mathematics and the methodologies of
scientific proof both as methods of analysis and as vehicles for the
demonstration 50 of that analysis.5 1 Members of the economic
disciplines hold themselves out as scientists, applying logical,
scientific deduction and induction to "prove" propositions. 2 Two

50. Demonstration and dialectic are the two principle

forms of reasoning

recognized by Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 19, at 1354a;
KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC, supra note 44, at 80. See also P. CHRISTOPHER
SMITH, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ORIGINAL ARGUMENT: DEMONSTRATION, DIALECTIC,

RHETORIC (1998).

Rhetoric is the form of demonstration used in argumentative

persuasion or "continuous discourse," whereas dialectic is more appropriate to
debate. Id. Demonstration provides the rhetorical process of arrangement with two
paradigms of deductive reasoning, sullogismos (syllogisms) and enthumema
(enthymemes), CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 12, at 38-60; KENNEDY, CLASSICAL
RHETORIC, supra note 44, at 80-84; Christof Rapp, Aristotle's Rhetoric, in THE

STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2002), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/
aristotle-rhetoric/,
and two
paradigms of inductive reasoning, the induction and the example. See ARISTOTLE,
THE RHETORIC, supra note 19, at 1356b; Brett G. Scharffs, The Characterof Legal
Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 752 n.58 (2004); Robert H. Schmidt, The

Influence of the Legal Paradigmon the Development of Logic, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 367,
372-73 (1999).
51. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 3-4; Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric and

Idealogy, supra note 27, at 38-39; Kritzer, supra note 33, at 42-43, 59.
52. GEORGE POLYA, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS: VOLUME I OF
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deductive forms, syllogism and enthymeme, and two inductive
forms, induction and example, are topoi of invention and
arrangement
in
science,
mathematics,
and
rhetorical
demonstration.5 3 Contemporary law and economics assumes and
advocates the rhetorical primacy of scientific and mathematical
methods of analysis in forming hypotheses, designing the
methods for testing those hypotheses, and analyzing the data,
statistics, and information collected for testing.5 4
Law and
economics also assumes the rhetorical primacy of scientific and
mathematical forms in discourse to demonstrate the discipline's
analyses, and to communicate its theses about human behavior.55
In contemporary law and economics, predictions and
prescriptions are informed by scientific testing and mathematical
MATHEMATICS AND PLAUSIBLE REASONING v-vi (1954); McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law
and Economics, supra note 5, at 752, 760. The pros and cons of this rhetorical
imperative are a lively topic of debate, and one that is growing in the wake of the
economic meltdown of 2009-2010.
E.g., Samuel Gregg, Smith versus Keynes:
Economics and Political Economy in the Post-CrisisEra, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
443, 445, 451-52, 455-56 (2010).
53. The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof is the
syllogism, while the structural form of rhetorical demonstration and legal argument
is the enthymeme. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 19, at 1355a. The
deductive structure of the syllogism and enthymeme provides the framework for each
of the organizational paradigms of legal discourse, including IRAC, IREAC, and
TREAT.
LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND
ORGANIZATION, chs. 10, 11, 19, 20 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing IREAC and variations
for objective and persuasive discourse); MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY HALLAM
DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, chs. 2, 6, 7 (2009) (discussing IRAC and
TREAT); James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs and Professionalism: Legal
Writing Professors Can Join the Academic Club, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711, 719-23
(2006) (discussing IRAC and IREAC); Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost:
Recapturing ClassicalRhetoric to Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483, 48487, 492 (2003) (discussing IRAC and IREAC).
54. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at 15-16 (examples of
taking scientific and mathematical approach to social problems); Posner, Foreword,
supra note 31, at 5 (discussing priority of mathematical and scientific forms of
analyses in economic analyses of legal problems); Richard A. Posner, Volume One of
The Journal of Legal Studies-An Afterword, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 437-38 (1972)
[hereinafter Posner, Afterword] (same).
See also Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos,
Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law
Related Services at the Millennium, 66 TENN. L. REV. 137, 190 n.493 (1998)
(discussing the concept of law as a scientific discipline and the application of
scientific and mathematical forms of analysis to legal problems); Minda, supra note
43, at 613-14 (discussing law and economics' use of scientific and mathematical
methods of analysis in law).
55. See Bryant G. Garth, Strategic Research in Law and Society, 18 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 57, 59 (1990); Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1980).
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analysis of data, not only by logic, intuition, common sense,
ideology, or philosophy.
The rhetoric of contemporary law and
economics and law and behavioral science supports assumptions
and methods of examination that can be scientifically proved
through the application of mathematics and science, which are
used to analyze empirical data to confirm or rebut hypotheses
and assumptions about human behavior in the context of the
law." It is important to note, however, that the propositions that
practitioners chose to "prove," as well as the designs of the
experiments and studies that they deem adequate and reliable to
"prove" the propositions, rely on rhetoric-the rhetoric that
selects those theories that the discipline holds to be reasonable,
reliable, and provable using scientific, mathematical, or
quantitative methodology.5"
Mathematics is a language, and, like any other language, is
rhetorical in nature.5 9 Mathematics is a valuable analytical tool,
but the elevation of mathematical forms and models as the
56. E.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 3-5.
57. See, e.g., HOWELL E. JACKSON, Louis KAPLOW ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS

FOR LAWYERS 372, 375-77 (2003).
58. Compare Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable
Propositionsof Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 1439 (1992) (critiquing ability of formal mathematics to "solve"
legal issues), Anthony T. Kronman, Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 678-79, 682
(1999) (discussing that mathematics is suited to immutable, infinite proofs, not to
variable human conditions), and John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons
about the Law from Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REV. 992
(1992) (drawing analogy between lessons from incompleteness of axiomatic systems
of mathematical logic and incompleteness of legal systems), with David R. Dow,
Godel and Langdell - A Reply to Brown and Greenberg's Use of Mathematics in Legal
Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 707 (1993) (critiquing the analogy that law is comparable
to science or mathematics, and arguing that is it much more like religion), and Kevin
W. Saunders, Realism, Ratiocination, and Rules, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 219 (1993)
(critiquing the attempt to apply theories regarding the indeterminacy of
mathematics to law in order to show that law must also be indeterminate), and Mike
Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in
Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51, 54, 61-63, 121-24 (1996)
[hereinafter Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises] (critiquing the analogy
that law is comparable to science or mathematics, and arguing that there is more to
gain from examining law as a discipline-a science, an art, and a technology).
59. See David N. Haynes, The Language and Logic of Law: A Case Study, 35 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 183, 188-89, 220 (1981); Townsend, Implications of Foundational
Crises, supra note 58, at 62-63, 141; Mike Townsend & Thomas Richardson,
Probability and Statistics in the Legal Curriculum: A Case Study in Disciplinary
Aspects of Interdisciplinarity,40 DUQ. L. REV. 447, 483-84 (2002); Joan C. Williams,
Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 439 (1987).
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primary method of demonstration in economic rhetoric comes
with a warning for the application of this trope in general legal
discourse: it is not realistic to assume that every legal issue and
60
social condition can be subjected to mathematical analysis.
Albert Einstein once said, "As far as the laws of mathematics
refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are
61
certain, they do not refer to reality.
The very word, proof, as in what the economist or behavioral
scientist has "proved," is inherently rhetorical in nature,6 2 and it
is a powerfully persuasive word. An assertion that something is
"proved" or even "can be proved" is a rhetorical assertion because,
even in mathematics, there are some assertions and propositions
that cannot be proved within a known mathematical system.63
The differences in opinions as to which assumptions and
predictions in economics are reasonable, reliable, and "provable"
using a scientific, mathematical, or quantitative methodology
have led to internal divisions within the law and economics
community, and to the creation of the law and behavioral science
discipline.64
The rhetorical use of mathematical forms as a trope of
arrangement and style in demonstrative discourse in the
discipline of law and economics is the most intriguing aspect of
the first rhetorical canon, and the most delicate topic from which

60. See generally Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and
Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1383-84
(2010); Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the
Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 881, 888-90 (1989); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics:Precisionand Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1329, 133132 (1971).
61. FRITJOF CAPRA, THE TAO OF PHYSICS: AN EXPLORATION OF THE PARRALLELS
BETWEEN MODERN PHYSICS AND EASTERN MYSTICISM 41 (1975) (quoting Albert
Einstein).
62. McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 5, at 752, 760.
63. See Anthony D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretationof
Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 597 (1989); Steven P. Goldberg, On Legal and
Mathematical Reasoning, 22 JURIMETRICS 83, 87 n.26 (1981); Susan K. Houser,
Metaethics and the Overlapping Consensus, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1152 (1993);
Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 136 n.3 (1992) (collecting
sources to draw parallels between mathematical incompleteness theorem and the
inherent uncertainty in social policy, the sciences, and literature); Rudolph J. Peritz,
Computer Data and Reliability:A Call for Authentication of Business Records Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 956, 999 n.214 (1986); Roy Stone,
Affinities and Antinomies in Jurisprudence,1964 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 266, 281.
64. See discussion infra Part III.B.4.
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to draw prescriptions for legal discourse. The appearance of
mathematical certainty in law and economics rhetoric is an
attractive tool, but it may be too seductive-in the sense of it
being confusing, misleading, or unjustifiably convincing-when
used in discourse intended for non-economist legal audiences.
Critics have challenged legal economists for adopting complex
mathematical formulae to demonstrate findings that carry only
specious relevance to actual legal problems and social
conditions.6 5 Nevertheless, the practitioners of neoclassical law
and economics have claimed their greatest successes through the
a priori, ex ante, positivist application of mathematical formulas
to legal topics and problems. 66 Unfortunately, this has come at a
cost-namely, a string of mathematically verifiable prescriptions
that brought about policies that contributed to the severity of the
Great Recession.
As explained above, the purpose of this Article is not to
critique the benefits or costs of the use of the four canons of law
and economics in the economic analysis of law. Rather, the
purpose is to explore the application of these rhetorical canons in
legal discourse generally. On the one hand, mathematics is a
language, and thus rhetorical, and its particular form of
persuasion is an appeal to certainty by the open demonstration of
the truth and logic of its workings. 67 On the other hand,
mathematical forms of demonstration may be employed to
attempt to overcome "the difference between truth in
mathematics and truth in law-between logical truths.., and
rhetorical or dialectical or polemical truths"6 8 -by cloaking the

65. E.g., MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS, supra note 25, at 44-45;
Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra note 27, at 38; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The

Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86
MICH. L. REV. 465, 485-90 (1987).
66. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at xix (championing the

unity, simplicity, and power, but also the subtlety, of economic principles); James R.
Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and the
Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 LAw & HIST. REV. 275, 287-88
(1997); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U.
L. REV. 4, 5 (1994) ("Assumptions about preference have enabled neoclassical
economics and public choice theory to describe both private and public markets by
means of mathematical models that have great elegance and rhetorical power.");
Richard Posner, The Sociology of the Sociology of Law: A View from Economics, 2
EUR. J.L. & ECON. 265, 274 (1995).
67. See McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 5, at 761, 763;
Kronman, supra note 58, at 679; Schmidt, supra note 50, at 395-96.
68. See Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and
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legal discourse in the rhetorical garb of mathematics 69 and
science, 70 making the findings appear to be more certain and
It seems highly likely that
absolute than they truly are.
government policy was shifted because of the perceived certainty
Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604 (1983) (citing two of the most influential
modern rhetoricians, Kenneth Burke, Politics as Rhetoric, 93 ETHICS 45, 46-47
(1982); and CHAIM PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS ON MORAL
AND LEGAL REASONING 120-74 (1980); CHAIM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND
THE HUMANITIES 1-61, 117-33 (1979)). The difference between formal logic and the
absolute proof of the syllogism, and informal logic used in everyday discourse to
assert the most probable arguments in everyday situations, is one of the primary
impetuses that motivated the move to contemporary schools of rhetoric building on
the work of Burke and Perelman. See also BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES, supra
note 21; BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES, supra note 21; PERELMAN, REALM OF
RHETORIC, supra note 21; PERELMAN & OBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC,
supra note 9. Pigou, one of the forefathers of neoclassical law and economics, pointed
out the distinction between formal logic and pure mathematics on the one side and
the "realistic sciences" on the other; in this classification, economics was a "realistic
science." A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 5 (4th ed. 1962) ("On the one
side are the sciences of formal logic and pure mathematics, whose function it is to
discover implications. On the other side are the realistic sciences, such as physics,
chemistry and biology, which are concerned with actualities.").
69. E.g., JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGALECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY (2007); McCloskey, Rhetoric of
Law and Economics, supra note 5, at 752-54; Joseph Vining, The Gift of Language,
See also Dan Ariely, George
73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1581, 1583-84 (1998).
Loewenstein & Drazan Prelec, "Coherent Arbitrariness': Stable Demand Curves
Without Stable Preferences, 118 Q. J. ECON. 73-106 (2003) (demonstrating how the
illusion of stable, ordered preferences can be created with arbitrary anchors); Gary S.
Becker, IrrationalBehavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1, 4 (1962).
70. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS, supra note 25, at 147; Horwitz,
supra note 55, at 912; Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 469-81 (1974). The excessively persuasive effect of
scientific demonstration is also a problem in non-economic legal settings, such as
evidence law. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
MODERN EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE § 7.8, at 992 (1995) ("Scientific proof
may suggest unwarranted certainty to lay factfinders, especially if it comes dressed
up in technical jargon, complicated mathematical or statistical analysis, or involves a
magic machine ('black box') that may seem to promise more than it delivers"); John
William Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert
Testimony by Restrictions of Function,Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 367
n.81 (1992) ("There is virtual unanimity among courts and commentators that
evidence perceived by jurors to be 'scientific' in nature will have particularly
persuasive effect."). See also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (scientific evidence "assume[s] a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a
jury of laymen"); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973)
(describing scientific testimony's "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness").
But see Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About
Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific
"Objectivity," 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083 (1993) (jurors are able to evaluate competing
scientific and technical testimony).
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of the formulas that supported law and economics' prescriptions
regarding unregulated markets and government non-interference
in financial systems. This possibility sends a significant message
of caution for the ethos-minded use of mathematical and scientific
forms in general legal discourse.
2.

INCENTIVES AND COSTS: A LANGUAGE USED TO
CHARACTERIZE LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM

The rhetoric of traditional and contemporary law and
economics begins with a seminal insight of economics: that people
respond to incentives7 1 and that legal rules and the legal system
can create incentives that will influence human behavior in one
direction and can create disincentives that will influence human
behavior in the other direction.7 2 The law can "encourage socially
desirable conduct and discourage undesirable conduct" by
rewarding or subsidizing certain behavior and punishing or
taxing other behavior.7 3 Legal rules and the legal system can
increase the costs of certain behavior and lessen the costs of other
74
behavior.
The premise that people respond to incentives is rhetorical;7 5
it is both an assumption and a presumption that shapes the
predictions that analysts using the methodology of law and
economics can make about the effects of law, as well as the
71. Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 6, at 1054; Yuval
Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 980, 987 (2009).
72. See Paul J. Heald & James E. Heald, Mindlessness and Law, 77 VA. L. REV.
1127, 1132 (1991); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral
Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 412-14 (2005); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science, supra note 6, at 1054.
73. Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 6, at 1054. See
Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 164-65 (1996); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous PersonalInformation,
102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1667, 1711 (2008); Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxation: A
CriticalAnalysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 343-47 (1989).
74. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at 84; Steven Garber,
Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes,
1998 WIS. L. REV. 237, 284-86 (1998); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science,
supranote 6, at 1054; Peter Reuter, A Just Use of Economics or Just Use Economics,
70 CAL. L. REV. 850, 852-54 (1982).
75. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright
Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009) (discussing the rhetoric of incentives in
copyright law); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1197 (1996) (same).
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recommendations that they are willing to make about changes to
the law.7" Law and economics imported this assumption from the
discipline of economics, along with the assumption that people
react rationally to incentives.7 7
Economists' examination of human behavior within various
legal and social environments of the world involves the
characterization of many phenomena as either incentives or
costs. 78 The canon of incentives and costs states that humans and
human institutions facing choices in conditions of scarce
making
require
that consequently
resources-conditions
choices-will act in ways that achieve or maximize the incentives
When the actor under
and avoid or minimize the costs.7 9
examination is government, the rhetoric of the discipline defines
the benefits and rewards offered or imposed by government as
incentives and the costs imposed or perpetuated by government
as taxes or externalities.8 0 When the actors under examination
are private parties, the rhetoric of the discipline defines
incentives and costs in economic terms such as offers,
inducements, price, or rent.8 The presumption is that humans
76. See Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 6, at 1054;
Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies Versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in Behavioral
Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781, 1795-96 nn.42-44 (2003) (discussing
"overadvocacy" of legal incentives).
77. Russell Korobkin, Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics, 32 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 781, 795 (2005); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra
note 6, at 1054-55; George J. Stigler, Economists and Public Policy, 1982
REGULATION 13-16 (May-June 1982).
78. See Balganesh, supra note 75, at 1591-92; Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen,
The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the United
States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555, 1589-92 (2008); Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted
Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral
Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1141-42, 1198-99 (2001); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science, supra note 6, at 1058.
79. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at 4; Philip B. Heymann,
The Problem of Coordination:Bargaining and Rules, 86 HARV. L. REV. 797, 829-30,
848-49 (1973); Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick, FunctionalLaw and Economics:
The Search for Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431,
448-49 (2004).
80. See generally WOUTER J. KELLER, TAX INCIDENCE: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
APPROACH (1980); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at 22;
Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1717, 1740-41 (1982); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Status and Incentive Aspects of
JudicialDecisions, 79 GEO. L.J. 1447, 1463-64 (1991).
81. Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing
Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1167-68 (1993); Jonathan R.
Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model:
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are motivated to alter their behavior in response to incentives
82
and costs.
The language of economics-cost, benefit, incentives,
disincentives, externalities, and economics-already is widely
embraced in the law. Courts and scholars alike have widely
accepted the use of economic considerations in legal analysis and
often use the language of incentives and costs in their discussions
of law and legal analysis, as suggested by the following chart:
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An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 492-94 (1988); Richard
S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and the Standard Analysis of Monopoly Rent
Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, a 'Sociological" Account, and Some Illustrative
Stories, 78 IOWA L. REV. 327, 329-30 n.3 (1993); Roger G. Noll, "Buyer Power" and
Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 600-01 (2005).
82. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at 4; Korobkin, supra
note 77, at 781, 795; Stigler, supra note 77, at 13-16.
83. Westlaw databases: ALLFEDS includes all federal cases since 1945;
ALLSTATES includes all state cases since 1945; JLR includes all journals and law
review articles, and BRIEFS includes appellate briefs filed in ten state courts of
appeals (Arizona, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Ohio, North
Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin) with coverage of appellate briefs ranging by
state; the earliest coverage is 1991-present (Washington) and the latest is 2006present (Arizona).
84. Westlaw search terms used: cost /2 benefit.
85. Westlaw search terms used: incentive /5 law legal government.
86. Westlaw search terms used: disincentive /5 law legal government.
87. Westlaw search terms used: externalit!.
88. Westlaw search terms used: economic /2 law analysis.
89. Entries marked 10,000+ indicate search results exceeding 10,000 documents
(articles).
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This chart, which is a taxonomy-an economic-friendly
demonstration of data in the form of a topos of arrangement and
a trope of style-indicates that the language (i.e., the rhetoric) of
costs and incentives is fairly common in legal analysis among
courts and throughout legal scholarship. Judges, legal scholars,
and practitioners employ the language of incentives and costs in
substantive legal discourse with great frequency. Every time an
author writes about a cost-benefit analysis, every time a change
in the law is said to "incentivize" certain conduct, every time a
license or permit application process is said to provide a
disincentive to an activity, and every time a change in procedural
rules is said to impose an externality on the cost of litigation, the
author uses a rhetorical trope of style. In this instance, the trope
is a figure of speech to discuss laws and legal conditions as
incentives or costs in contexts that are not necessarily
appropriate, such as contexts that do not involve business,
contracts, or the calculation of pecuniary sums or damages. 90
The basic statement that humans respond favorably to
incentives and unfavorably to costs disguises the rhetorical
complexity of this presumption when it comes to making
predictions about human behavior in legal situations and in
response to legal conditions. First, incentives and costs must be
designed, communicated, and recognized by the human actor or
institution; government must correctly design and communicate
its actions so as to offer the benefit or impose the tax that it
intends to bestow upon its audience of citizens, and private actors
must correctly design and communicate their actions so as to
accurately offer the intended inducement or impose the intended
price or rent. 9 ' Second, and equally important to the rhetoric of
the discipline, is that the human audience must perceive and
understand the action of the government or private actor, and
determining what should be perceived and understood as an
incentive as opposed to a cost is not always a simple process for
humans.

92

90. See, e.g., THOMAS CONLEY, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 (1990)
(discussing application of rhetorical appeal through ethos, pathos, and logos, in
situations beyond business, contracts, or the calculation of pecuniary sums or
damages); Levine & Saunders, supra note 21, at 118-21 (same); Fred A. Simpson &
Deborah J. Selden, When to Welcome Greeks Bearing Gifts-Aristotle and the Rules of
Evidence, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1009, 1011 (2003) (same).
91. See infra Part III.B.4.
92. Id.
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The rhetorical canon of incentives and cost is closely
associated with the canon of rational choice: the design,
communication, perception, and motivation concerning incentives
and costs require analysis and an understanding of the rhetorical
audience and the rhetorical situation.
Scientific empirical
analysis of human behavior indicates that there are limitations
on humans' abilities to understand and appreciate benefits and
costs. These limitations are assumed and represented in the
rhetorical statement that humans are creatures of bounded
abilities-bounded rationality, bounded ability to gather
information, bounded perception, and bounded cognition.9 3 These
bounds limit a human audience's ability to perceive and
understand the incentives and costs set before it, which in turn
complicates the predictions and prescriptions of economists
regarding the motivational effect of incentives and costs. This is
the principal rhetorical audience consideration involved in the
formulation of incentives and costs. As a separate consideration,
empirical evidence gathered from the social, cognitive, and brain
94
sciences indicates that humans are situational decision-makers.
A consideration of the rhetorical problems of audience and
situation are commonplace in rhetoric, and contemporary rhetoric
in particular, has covered this ground well.9 5

93. E.g., John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669
(1996); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation,74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 640 (1999); Jolls, Sunstein
& Thaler, supra note 6, at 1471; Stephen D. Hurd, Symposium: The Legal
Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1497 (1998); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1998); Herbert A.
Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1953).
94. See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 93, at 640; Hanson & Yosifon, The
Situation, supra note 7; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character,supra note 2.
95. E.g., White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 16, at 695: Bitzer, The Rhetorical
Situation, supra note 14, at 6-8, 389-92; Greenhaw, supra note 10, at 875-80. The
contemporary analysis of communication produces a formula for the speaker's
invention of discourse crafted for a given situation: Exigence (a]kla the rhetorical
problem, the reason for speaking, and the urgency thereof) + Audience (mediators of
change-those who may be moved from one point to another in the situation) +
Constraints (the physical or psychological limitations or opportunities of the
situation) = Fitting response (the speaker's purpose and objectives). See Bitzer, The
Rhetorical Situation, supra note 14, at 6-8, 390-92; Greenhaw, supra note 10, at 87580. This model easily can be applied to economic analysis: if the object of the
incentive has no choice, then there is no opportunity for theorizing rational choice of
incentives in that situation.
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3. EFFICIENCY: A RHETORICAL ECONOMIC CONCEPT
There are two kinds of efficiency in the rhetoric of law and
economics: (1) formal efficiency as a preference for simple, elegant
formulae and solutions, and (2) the substantive economic concepts
of efficiency as a standard and goal of law and policy. Both modes
employ a highly rhetorical device. The adoption and application
of the rhetorical primacy of science and mathematics carries
other implications for the discipline, including, for example, that
a more efficient and elegant solution to a problem is preferred
under the rhetoric of mathematics and science and subsequently
under the rhetorical systems of economics and law and
economics.9 6 The formal desire for efficiency in structure and
form leads to a marked preference for elegance and simplicity in
the equations and formulae of the discipline.9 7 Naturally, when
the first kind of efficiency produces elegant and effective formulae
that are substantively correct, this promotes the understanding
and persuasion of economists, but this Article describes this kind
of efficiency as offering a different layer of persuasion for noneconomists. Non-economists can appreciate the persuasiveness of
an elegant formula and a simple solution because this mode of
presentation promotes clarity and openness, revealing the
workings and falsifiability of the underlying reasoning.
In substantive terms, law and economics assumes and
advocates efficiency over more abstract concepts of fairness,
morality, and justice.9 8 This is not to say that fairness, morality,
and justice are never incorporated into an economic analysis, but
rather that economists find it preferable to assume such concepts
into the rhetorical economic concepts of efficiency. In other
words, when devising a model or prescription, economists prefer
to assume that a fair, moral, and just solution will be more
efficient according to one of the economic conceptions of
efficiency.99 Efficiency, or parsimony, in the rhetoric of law and

96. "Mathematical elegance often becomes the primary goal, with usefulness in
the realm of law, that combines logic with human experience, a mere afterthought."
Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 6, at 1054.
97.

See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at 16; Herbert

Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 4, 5
(1994).

98. E.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Efficiency and Equity: What Can
Be Gained by Combining Coase and Rawls?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 329, 329-30 (1998).
99. See, e.g., Henrik Lando, An Attempt to IncorporateFairnessinto an Economic
Model of Tort Law, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 575 (1997); Ugo Mattei, Efficiency as
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economics is not just a formal imperative for methods and
procedures of modeling paradigms and the formulation of
hypotheses and theses, but has also been advanced as a
substantive and instrumental imperative in positive examination
of conditions, normative analysis of possible conditions, and
prescriptions for future conditions. 00 Efficiency, therefore, has
become a rhetorical imperative in and of itself in the discipline of
law and economics. 10 1
The elevation of efficiency over other concepts associated
with the law, such as fairness, morality, and justice, makes the
work of law and economics simpler and easier in many ways, 10 2
but more difficult in other ways. 03 "Efficiency" has more than
Equity: Insights from Comparative Law and Economics, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 157 (1994); Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of

Justice: The Integration of Fairnessinto Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV. 249, 284-86,
316-17 (1998). See generally KEN BINMORE, 1 PLAYING FAIR: GAME THEORY AND
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1994); KEN BINMORE, 2 JUST PLAYING: GAME THEORY AND
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1998); DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1996); HERVt MOULIN, COOPERATIVE
MICROECONOMICS: A GAME-THEORETIC INTRODUCTION 3, 8 (1995); H. PEYTON
YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 8 (1994).
100. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at 13-16; MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 3-6 (1993); Robert D. Cooter,

Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of
Law and a Review of the Major Books, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1260, 1263 (1982) ("A
process is efficient when it yields the maximum output from given input, or
equivalently, when it yields a given output with the minimum input."); Frank I.

Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 307, 309 (1979); Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the
Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1032-35 (1978); Thomas S. Ulen,

The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract
Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 345-46 (1984).
101. Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 6, at 1054
(internal citations omitted):
Although efficiency need not be the sole or primary goal of legal policy,
economic analysis of law teaches that policymakers ignore the
efficiency implications of their actions at society's peril. Legal rights
that are unobjectionable in the abstract are not free but rather must be
measured against their opportunity costs.
102. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 3-4, 9-10
(2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter POLINSKY, LAW AND ECONOMICS]; Richard A. Posner, Some

Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 301 (1979); Cass R.
Sunstein, On Philosophy and Economics, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 333, 335-36, 348
(2000).
103. E.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 6, at 1508-09:
[L]aws may be efficient solutions to the problems of organizing
society ... [but] [t]he notion that laws emerge from considerations of
efficiency and conventional rent seeking would probably strike most
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one meaning in the rhetoric of law and economics. The rhetoric
has employed a clever twist on a common word to add three
specific, carefully crafted, and nonintuitive meanings for
substantive and instrumental efficiency in law and economics:
(1) "Productive efficiency" (sometimes referred to by the
undistinguishing term of "economic efficiency"), in which a
process or action produces the intended result with maximum
utility and minimum costs;1" 4 (2) "Pareto efficiency" 105 or
"allocative efficiency," in which the situation cannot be altered to
benefit one of the parties without causing a detriment to the
other party-benefit and detriment being defined by the parties
according to their subjective perceptions and preferences;' 0 6 and
(3) "Potential Pareto improvements" or "Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,"
in which a change in action causes incremental gains in benefits
or incentives that exceed incremental losses or costs imposed by
the change in action.107
The language of efficiency is intended to facilitate full and
complete communication to members of the economics discourse
community, as well as to create persuasive communication to
advocate the findings of the discipline to the outside world.
Within the discipline, the rhetoric of law and economics assumes
citizens as odd ....[M]any laws on the books appear to be difficult to
justify on efficiency grounds (for example, those that prohibit mutually
beneficial exchanges without obvious externalities) and seem to benefit
groups that do not have much lobbying power (such as the poor or
middle class).
104. Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025, 1028-29 (1987);
R. Quentin Grafton, Dale Squires & Kevin J. Fox, Private Property and Economic
Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource, 43 J. L. & ECON. 679, 690-91 (2000).
See also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 17; WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 611-20 (9th ed. 2004).
105. See VILFREDO PARETO, 4 THE MIND AND SOCIETY: THE GENERAL FORM OF
SOCIETY 1459, 1465-69 (1907) (Andrew Bongiorno et al. trans., 1935) (1907);
VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ann. S. Schwier trans., 1971)
(1906); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at 12.
106. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 17; POLINSKY, LAW AND ECONOMICS,
supra note 102, at 7 n.4; POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at 13-

14, 26; Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and Auction: PhilosophicalAspects of
the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 221 (1980); Richard A. Posner, The
Ethical & Political Bases of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491 (1980); Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980).
See also ALFRED MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 103-10, 433-35 (8th ed. 1920); ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 31-43 (1952); HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
160-71 (3d ed. 1992).
107. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 18.
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that it is easier to use science and mathematics to conceive of
models of efficiency, form hypotheses regarding efficiency, and
test those models and hypotheses than it would be to use the
same tools to test actual fairness, morality, and justice. The
models and forms that are developed give the appearance of
rigorous scientific analysis that "proves" the hypotheses that a
certain change in the law will produce efficient results, whichever
of the three forms of "efficient" results are assumed in the models
and hypotheses.
It is highly desirable to be able to observe the success or
failure of any practical study, and models and hypotheses of
fairness, morality, and justice might suffer from the fact that they
might be tautological and non-falsifiable within the rhetorical
definitions of law, philosophy, and ethics. It is easier to observe
the success or failure of models and hypotheses concerning one or
more of the economic definitions of efficiency through the use of
scientific and mathematical methods of analyzing statistics and
econometric data than it would be through the use of models that
tested fairness, morality, or justice. However, rational humans
embrace concepts of fairness, morality, and justice and act on
them, which complicates economics predictions and prescriptions
as to the effect of law and legal conditions. The result of
prescriptions concerning unregulated, unconstrained, but
"efficient" financial markets is revealed in stark detail in the
Great Recession. The "efficiency" of non-regulation or underregulation of banking practices regarding the extension of
mortgage credit and the under-regulation of securities practices
regarding the collateralization of mortgage obligations led to a
very real problem of valuation of major banking and securities
institutions, which in turn caused a crisis of confidence that
brought down the stock market, tied up the financial insurance
sector, tightened credit in every sector of the economy, and
further threatened the banking and securities industry with a
general, sustained economic downturn.
4. THE CONTEMPORARY THEORY OF RATIONAL CHOICE: A
THEORY CORRECTED BY MODERN BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES,
COGNITIVE STUDIES, AND BRAIN SCIENCE

Law and economics presumes that human actors will
respond to legal conditions in rational ways. The early adopters
of the law and economics analysis of law accepted a rhetorical
assumption that when faced with choices, humans will respond
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rationally rather than randomly and capriciously; most
importantly for the discipline of law and economics, it is assumed
that humans will act predictably."8 The rhetoric of this position
is known generally as rational choice theory."19
Over the last five decades, rational choice theory employed
by law and economics analysts has produced marked success in
explaining and predicting human behavior when humans are
confronted by incentives, costs, and opportunities, and many of
these successes have been used to make accurate predictions of
the effect of existing laws or changes in the law on human
behavior.'
The successes produced by the rational choice theory
lead some scholars to argue that this theory is all that an
economic approach to the law requires, as long as the theory is
defined broadly enough and is shaped to encompass all areas
where predictions are reliable and verifiable and to exclude all
areas where predictions are unreliable and refutable."' In fact,
some scholars argue that the "correction" that behavioral science
applies to economics-rejecting many, if not most, of the
assumptions that the rational choice theory represents-means
that a behavioral approach to law and economics does not fit
12
within the rhetoric of economics or law and economics at all.
They argue that analysts of behavioral science may be applying
psychological, sociocultural, or cognitive theories to the law, but
they are not applying economics." 3 This is indeed a crisis within
the rhetoric of the discipline.
The definition of what it means to be "rational" in response
to legal conditions and the weight given to the presumption of
rationality differs depending on the legal situation that is being
studied and the legal economist preforming the study. Cognitive
108.
109.
110.
111.

See Korobkin & Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience, supra note 6, at 1055.
Id.
See id. at 1053-54.
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1553-58 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Rational Choice].
112. Id. at 1558 ("If there is any theory in their approach, it is not an economic
theory."). See infra Part III.C.
113. See Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 111, at 1558:
They take a psychological approach to phenomena that are sociological
and psychological as much as they are economic, yet call their
approach economic ....
[Their approach] would be easier to
understand if it were offered to the reader as a contribution to the
psychological analysis of law rather than to the economic analysis of
law.
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science has indicated that in some situations, humans make
decisions against their self-interest, which is contrary to the
traditional neoclassical rational choice theory that humans
always act to maximize their self-interest. 114 A large part of the
correction that the behavioral sciences impose in the rhetoric of
traditional law and economics is a correction in the definition of
"rationality" and the weight given to the presumption of
rationality in the face of various legal conditions." 5
The
behavioral approach asserts that this definition and assessment
of weight must be modified with the knowledge and
understanding gained from behavioral science, which gives a
clearer picture of the nature and limits of human rationality in
response to legal situations.
The acceptance, or at least the acknowledgement, that
rational choice is more bounded than traditional rational choice
theory has predicted presents a problem for the rhetoric of the
discipline and creates complexity in the use of rational choice
theory as a rhetorical lens for legal discourse. The rhetoric of the
discipline can redefine its theories and definitions of rationality
so as to incorporate the empirical observations of seemingly nontraditional, irrational behavior in legal situations requiring a
choice. 116 For example, in response to the ultimatum game
studies,1 " the definition of rationality may be modified from a

114. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 7; Hanson &
Yosifon, The Situational Character,supra note 2.
115. See Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 6, at 1055
(internal citations omitted):
There is considerable debate within both the economics and law-andeconomics communities about precisely what rational choice theory is
and is not. As it is applied implicitly or explicitly in the law-andeconomics literature, however, it is understood alternatively as a
relatively weak, or "thin", presumption that individuals act to
maximize their expected utility, however they define this, or as a
relatively strong, or "thick", presumption that individuals act to
maximize their self-interest.
116. In fact, it is only rational for law and economics scholars to attempt to
preserve the theory of rational choice by expanding the definition of "rational," as
this will avoid throwing out the entire canon of rational choice as an operative
foundation for economic models, theories, and predictions.
117. Ultimatum game studies test human action in the following situation: A
person is assigned a sum and asked to offer a portion of the sum to another person
with the understanding that if the other person accepts the offer, both will gain
something-the offeror keeps the remainder of the sum not offered, and the offeree
keeps what was offered and accepted-but if the other person rejects the offer,
neither will gain anything. Traditional rational choice theory predicted that the
offeror would offer a tiny sum because this would maximize the offeror's pecuniary
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strict proposition that humans will act to maximize selfish
pecuniary interests to a broader definition that humans will act
to maximize their own interests of whatever kind, one interest
being the motivation to be fair in bargaining and to be perceived
as being fair.
The rational choice theory may be definitional, providing
that humans rationally make choices to maximize their selfinterest. 118 It may also be based on a conception that humans
make choices to maximize their expected utility,1 19 or on an
assumption of human self-interest,12 0 or on humans' motivation
toward wealth maximization.1 2 ' Either way, the consequences for
legal discourse point to the same goal: Law should be
self-interest while allowing the offeree to gain something, however small. Ultimatum
game studies belied this prediction by showing that offerees routinely rejected small
offers, such as offers less than 20% of the total sum, and that offerors tended to offer
much larger sums, frequently in the range of 40-50% of the total sum. Theories
arising from these empirical data revolve around the concept of fairness and the
parties' perception of what is fair in the situation-that offerees will not accept an
offer that is perceived to be unfair even though any offer, no matter how small,
increased their pecuniary well-being, and offerors offered a greater portion with an
apparent motivation of trying to be fair or at least to be perceived as being fair. This
prompts researchers to include fairness and the perception of fairness as factors in
conceptions of rational self-interest. See, e.g., Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox,
Psychological Principlesin Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1,
33-39 (1999); Kent Greenfield & Peter C. Kostant, An Experimental Test of Fairness
Under Agency and Profit-Maximization Constraints (With Notes on Implications for
Corporate Governance), 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983 (2003); Peter H. Huang, Reasons
Within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining,79 OR. L.
REV. 435, 474-75 (2000); Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88
GEO. L.J. 1789, 1818-19 (2000); Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the
Future of the Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 433, 459.

118. See Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves?: Implications for
Law and Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23, 24-28 (1997) (discussing definitional
problems caused by apparent "multiple selves" whose interests are served); Korobkin
& Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 6, at 1061.
119. See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 18 (1994); SCOTT
PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 83 (1993); Geoffrey

Brennan, Comment, What Might Rationality Fail to Do, in THE LIMITS OF
RATIONALITY 51, 52 (Karen Schweers Cook & Margaret Levi eds., 1990); Korobkin &
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 6, at 1062.
120. Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of
Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (1998); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and
Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1320
(1986); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 6, at 1065.
121. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 26; POLINSKY, LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra
note 102, at 10; Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 6, at
1066.
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communicated to people in a manner that maximizes the
audience's incentives to accept and to be persuaded by the legal
communication, and that minimizes the costs that the
communication imposes on the audience.
V. CONCLUSION
The rhetorical canons of law and economics did not cause the
Great Recession. Canons of rhetoric are tools for legal discourse,
not universal goals or perfect solutions. Law and economics
provides a rhetorical lens through which legal authors might
examine and improve the persuasiveness of their discourse, but a
lens, like any other tool, is only as good as its user. This Article's
critique of the four rhetorical canons of law and economics seeks
to reveal the interconnected relationships among the canons to
enable the reader to trace those canons, as well as the
assumptions and theories that they represent, in ongoing legal
economic discourse.
Modern and contemporary rhetoric has advanced and
improved upon the ancient rhetoricians' basic perceptions of
human behavior and knowledge of human nature, but the more
complex models of reasoning in contemporary rhetoric have not
replaced the classical rhetorical concept of ethos. Contemporary
rhetoric has learned lessons from cognitive studies and brain
science that confirm the importance of the classical rhetorical
concept of pathos and the necessity that rhetoric examine the
values of the audience in the rhetorical situation so as to
anticipate the audience's emotional reaction to the discourse.
Similar lessons are being learned in contemporary law and
economics as brain science and cognitive studies add to our
"understanding of understanding" and motivate our study of
motivation, adding to the behavioral science that seeks to
improve the design of incentives in the face of new conceptions of
rational choice. Each discipline can learn lessons from the other
about the motivation and persuasion of different audiences in
different situations.
Contemporary rhetoric can learn much from law and
Efficiency, when used in appropriate ways in
economics.
appropriate rhetorical situations, can improve discourse in style,
arrangement, and invention. The expression of legal conditions
and legal effects in the language of incentives and costs inspires
imagination that facilitates better understanding of the
advantages and disadvantages of laws and legal policy; the
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widespread acceptance of the language of incentives and cost in
the law is further evidence of the rhetorical power that the
language has in many areas of the law. The persuasiveness of
mathematics and science extends to their forms and the
substance of their proofs, and the use of those methods and forms
may create meaning and inspire imagination that improves
comprehension and understanding. The forms of mathematics
and science can promote clarity and open demonstration,
permitting examination of the workings of the discourse -and
promoting the opportunity for falsification and rebuttal.
The rhetorical tools of law and economics are powerful, but
not universally persuasive. A topic of invention is a single place
to find a method of argumentation, not the only place. Many
audiences will not respond to mathematical and scientific forms,
especially if those forms are used to avoid a primary question of
fairness or justice. The intuitive uses of efficiency in form, i.e.,
elegance, openness, and clarity, and in the elimination of costs
and waste may be widely persuasive, but other economic
rhetorical takes on efficiency (Paretoand Kaldor-Hicks efficiency)
are best left to the discourse of economists. The language of
incentives and costs may be applied to facilitate communication
in many rhetorical situations in the law, but the general
application of that language must fit the topic and the situation;
simply identifying something as an incentive or a cost will not be
persuasive if the audience or the particular circumstance
demands a different topos for argument or a more apt trope of
style.
The ethos of the speaker remains critical in the rhetoric of
law and economics. Many of the sharpest and deepest criticisms
of contemporary economics start with the assertion that
mathematical and scientific methods of daunting complexity are
used to hide the workings of the underlying reasoning, not to
promote understanding or persuasion. The method is not rhetoric
but a resort to the cudgel, used to overpower the audience with
coercion instead of persuasion, and a refusal to openly
demonstrate the reasoning for falsification or rebuttal, all under
an implied threat to any person who would dare to rebut the force
of the powerful device of rhetoric. Charts and diagrams may be
used to distract the audience or trick them into believing a
mathematical or scientific analysis was performed to produce the
assertions made in the rhetoric, even when little or no
mathematics or science was truly involved. Quantitative analysis
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may crunch data, the true meaning of which is clouded by the
assumptions that were made in choosing which data to collect or
exclude and in the premises drawn from the assumptions that
determined the possible conclusions that the experiment could
reasonably be expected to produce.
Practitioners of law and economics rely on mathematics and
science, efficiency, incentives and costs, and rational choice
theory for full and complete communication with legal
economists. However, these practitioners often use the same
topics and tropes as powerful props in communication with
lawmakers and policy-makers-a process which may be either
right or wrong according to the ethos of the speaker and the type
of communication used.12 2 The lesson for all rhetoricians, those of
the law and economics discipline, as well as those of general legal
discourse, is this: The four rhetorical canons of law and
economics, like the canons of the other schools of contemporary
rhetoric, may be employed to promote effective communication for
the purpose of persuasion, or they may be used as mere rhetoric
designed to distract, confuse, obfuscate, or coerce the audience.
The decision whether to use the topics and tropes to inspire the
imagination and promote understanding or to obscure the
underlying reasoning and confuse the ability to understand the
communication is itself a rhetorical situation in which all
rhetoricians must choose which course to follow. By revealing
these potential uses and misuses of the topics and tropes
represented by the four canons of laws and economics rhetoric,
this Article concludes with an expression of hope that the reader
will choose wisely.

122. My colleague, David Herzig, summarized this lesson by repeating the apt
comment, "Statistics never lie-but liars use statistics."

